The paper introduces lobby interaction in the 'protection for sale' framework. Special interest groups provide unconditional contributions where the marginal contribution of a lobby is decreasing in the total sum collected by the government. In contrast to the 'protection for sale'model, for a given proportion of capital owners in the organized sectors, an increase in the number of lobbies has an impact on trade policy. It is also shown that an increase in the number of lobbies has two opposite e¤ects on each lobby's contribution: a competition e¤ect which lowers a lobby's contribution and a political in ‡uence e¤ect which tends to increase its contribution.
Introduction
Many economic decisions in trade policy and public …nance provide bene…ts for small groups of agents while the cost is incurred by the society as a whole. Grossman and Helpman (1994) adapt the common agency approach in Bernheim and Whinston (1986) to develop the 'protection for sale' model which aims to explain the in ‡uence of organized interest groups on trade policy.
They show that the policy choice induced by contingent contributions maximizes a weighted sum of the interest of organized groups and that of the decision-maker. This model has become a workhorse model in the political economy of trade policy. 1 One of the results in the 'protection for sale' model is that only the total proportion of capital owners in organized sectors matters for the policy outcome, that is, lobbying by a few I am grateful to Frank Staehler, Rhema Vaithianathan and the participants of the 5th ATW for very helpful comments y E-mail: tatyana.chesnokova@adelaide.edu.au. Address: School of Economics, Napier Building, The University of Adelaide, SA 5005, Australia. 1 Several recent papers have extended the 'protection for sale'model to incorporate endogenous process of lobby formation (Mitra (1999) , foreign lobbies (Gawande et al, 2006 ) , lobbying between upstream and downstream producers (Gawande and Krishna, 2005) , labour unions (Matschke and Sherlund, 2006) , …rm size (Bombardini, 2008 ).
large interest groups would result in the same tari¤s or subsidies as lobbying by many small ones.
This result follows from the fact that the assumption on the government objective function does not allow for lobby interaction. In this paper I analyze a di¤erent government objective function and allow for the marginal contribution of a lobby to be decreasing in the total amount of money collected by the government. In particular, I assume that the government puts an additional weight on the welfare of an organized lobby equal to the proportion of this lobby contribution in relation to the total sum contributed by all lobbies to the government. I show that in contrast to the 'protection for sale'model, the number of organized interest groups does matter for the choice of trade policy.
Such an objective function can be thought as an alternative way to model the e¤ects of contributions on trade policy. In the 'protection for sale'model, campaign contributions are a form of political investment, that is special interest groups can buy economic policy directly by contributing to the politicians. However, there is little evidence on connection from campaign contributions to legislative voting behavior. 2 Ansolabehere et al (2003) argue against the theory of campaign contributions as a political investment. They suggest that one of the alternative explanations is that "... money buys access, rather than policy directly. Legislators and their sta¤ers are busy people. Campaign contributions are one way to improve the chance of getting to see the legislator about matters of concern to the group." Hence, one can argue that the money spent by an organized group buys the in ‡uence over economic policy, but the extent of such in ‡uence depends on the money spent by other groups.
Another key di¤erence between Grossman and Helpman (1994) and this paper is that in the former the lobbies provide contribution schedules to the government, that is a lobby can commit to a contingent policy contribution before the policy is chosen. This assumption generates a multiplicity of equilibrium levels of contributions and the authors focus only on a particular 'truthful'equilibrium. One also cannot solve explicitly for the equilibrium levels of contributions and analyze the e¤ects of a stronger competition among interest groups, i.e., larger number of lobbies, on the contributions. In my model, special interest groups provide unconditional payments to the government, hence, I can explicitly derive equilibrium levels of contributions.
This allows me to identify two opposite e¤ects of an increase in the number of lobbies: the competition e¤ect which increases lobby's contribution and the political in ‡uence e¤ect which tends to increase it. The latter e¤ect dominates for a smaller number of …rms, as the decrease in political in ‡uence has a more signi…cant impact on each lobby when there are only a few lobbies with access to the politicians. 
The Model
The description of the economy follows Grossman and Helpman (1994) with some key di¤erences which will be outlined later. The economy is populated by L agents with the utility function
3 As discussed in Persson and Tabellini (2000) .
where sub-utility functions, u i , are twice continuously di¤erentiable and strictly concave, c h 0 is individual h's consumption of the numeraire export good, and c h i is his consumption of good i 2 [1; N ]. Solving the utility maximization problem we get a vector of demand functions
; where p is a vector of prices. Consumption of the numeraire good
where
is consumer surplus. Using Roy's identity we have
The production structure is as follows. One unit of the numeraire good is produced using one unit of labor, hence, wage is …xed at unity. Each of N goods is produced using capital speci…c to this sector and a mobile factor, labor. The return to speci…c capital is i (p i ) with
It is assumed that the speci…c capital in each sector i is owned by H i agents. Let i = H i L denote the proportion of population which owns capital in sector i: The total number of capital-owners is denoted by H = P H i .
I consider a case of a small open economy, that is, the world prices are …xed at p . Each industry may receive a speci…c tari¤ (subsidy) t i ; hence, the domestic prices are p i = p i + t i :
which is redistributed by a per capita subsidy of
The aggregate welfare of the capital-owners in sector i is
while the aggregate welfare of (L H) agents who do not own any capital is
Then the social welfare is
The subset of sectors J is organized into lobbies where J also denotes the number of organized lobbies. The proportion of population who are capital-owners in organized sectors is denoted by
I assume that each organized lobby j 2 J provides an unconditional contribution C j to the government. This is the …rst key di¤erence between my model and the 'protection for sale' model, as in the latter the lobbies provide contribution schedules contingent on future policies.
The timing is as follows. First, each organized sector decides on a contribution C j . Second, the government chooses a vector of tari¤s (equivalently, a vector of prices p) to maximize its objective function G (p).
The second di¤erence is the way the government objective function is modelled, that is, how the marginal bene…t of contribution of a lobby is a¤ected by the contributions of other lobbies. In the 'protection for sale' model the government maximizes the weighted sum of the social welfare and total contributions, i.e., G = P j2J C j + W; and hence, the marginal bene…t of contribution by each lobby does not depend on how much the government collects in total from all organized sectors. In this paper I consider a setting where the marginal contribution of a lobby is decreasing in the total sum collected. In particular, I assume that the government values the welfare of the organized sectors weighted proportionately to their contributions, i.e., the government's objective function is
where C = P j2J C j is the total amount contributed by all lobbies. This objective function can be interpreted in the following way. The government politicians care about the social welfare. However, they also spend their time in the o¢ ce talking to organized lobbies and then, when they decide on trade policy, they take the interests of those groups into account. Since politicians' total time is limited, they allocate a time slot to each lobby in proportion to the contribution paid by this lobby. Hence, a contribution is basically a price paid for access to the politicians.
First, I solve for the equilibrium price vector p given the vector of contributions (C 1 ; :::; C J ).
Start with an organized sector k 2 J. Di¤erentiating (4) with respect to price p k we have dG(p) dp k = dW (p) dp
In equilibrium, the government chooses price p k such that dG(p) dp k = 0:
Then the equilibrium speci…c tari¤ in an organized sector k equals
where g k y k m 0 k < 0. Hence, we have t k > 0, that is organized sectors are protected by import tari¤s. Following Mitra (1999), I also assume that g 0 k < 0: The corresponding ad valorem tari¤ equals
where z k = y k m k is the output-imports ratio and e k = m 0 k p k m k is the elasticity of imports.
Next, consider an unorganized sector k = 2 J: Di¤erentiating (4) with respect to price p k we have dG(p) dp
Hence, the equilibrium speci…c import subsidy in an unorganized sector k = 2 J equals
and the corresponding ad valorem import subsidy is
Finally, I solve for the equilibrium level of contributions. Each organized industry k 2 J chooses a contribution C k to maximize its welfare net of contribution, W k (p) C k . Hence, in equilibrium C k satis…es the following condition
which we can rewrite as 0 B B @ dW k (p) dp k dp k dC k + X j2J j6 =k dW k (p) dp i dp i dC k
dW k (p) dp i dp
Using (5) and (7) we have that the e¤ects of contribution C k on prices equal dp
Next, using (1) we derive the e¤ects of prices on welfare of lobby k to be equal to
Then, the equilibrium contributions C k ; k 2 J; are determined by a set of conditions (9) (11).
Symmetric Lobbies
In this Section I analyze a case where all sectors are symmetric, i.e., all sectors have the same demand and supply functions and the same world prices. I also assume that the proportion of population that owns a speci…c factor in any organized sector is the same: i = . Then, the proportion of the population which owns capital in organized sectors equals 0 = J: I introduce the following notation y j = y o ; g j = g o ; z j = z o ; e j = e o ; for all j 2 J y i = y u ; g i = g u ; z i = z u ; e i = e u for all i = 2 J I focus on a symmetric equilibrium where all lobbies contribute the same amount, i.e., C j = c:
Then using (5) (6) and (7) (8) it is straightforward to show that the equilibrium speci…c and ad valorem tari¤s/subsidies are
is an indicator function which shows whether a sector i is organized or not.
Next, I …nd the equilibrium levels of contributions. Using (10) we have that the e¤ects of contribution C k on prices are dp
From (11) we have that the e¤ects of tari¤s on the welfare of lobby k are
Hence, in the interior equilibrium, condition (9) becomes
and the equilibrium contribution for each lobby equals
The following Proposition summarizes these results. 
Comparative Statics
Next, I look at the e¤ects of an increase in the number of lobbies on the equilibrium tari¤s and contributions. First, consider the case where one unorganized sector becomes an organized one while the proportion of the population in each lobby does not change, that is, J increases but stays constant. Using (12) , it is straightforward to show that this results in lower tari¤s in organized sectors and does not a¤ect the subsidies in the unorganized sectors:
Note that this is di¤erent from the result in the 'protection for sale'model where an increase in J raises subsidies in unorganized sectors.
Next, using (13) we have that the e¤ect of an increase in J on contribution c equals
in the rest of this paper, so that condition b > 1 always holds: Hence, the contribution from each sector, c; is increasing in the number of lobbies if there are only a few organized sectors, i.e., J < 1 + p 1 + b. Otherwise, an increase in J lowers each sector's contribution. 5 What is the intuition behind this result? An increase in the number of lobbies decreases the weight that the government assigns to the welfare of each organized group. Hence, each lobby has now an incentive to increase its own contribution to restore its political in ‡uence. On the other hand, the marginal bene…t of its contribution decreases as the competition among lobbies is enhanced and, hence, there is also an incentive to decrease c, so that the marginal bene…t of contribution equals its marginal cost (which is 1). For a …xed the former e¤ect is stronger for a smaller number of …rms, as the decrease in political in ‡uence, that is the change from
; has a more signi…cant impact on each lobby. Then, as the government becomes more benevolent, that is as increases, the latter e¤ect starts to dominate at a larger number of lobbies, i.e., 1 + p 1 + b rises.
What can we say about total contributions collected by the government, C = Jc? It is straightforward to see that C is increasing in the number of lobbies:
The following Proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 2 In the symmetric equilibrium, for a given proportion of population in each organized sector, ; an increase in the number of lobbies, J, decreases tari¤ s in the organized sectors, does not a¤ ect subsidies in unorganized sectors, and raises total contributions C. Contribution from each sector, c; increases i¤ the number of organized sectors is su¢ ciently small , i.e., J < 1 + p 1 + b.
Now, suppose that the total proportion of organized capital owners in the economy, 0 ; is …xed. Note that, as J increases, the proportion of capital owners in each organized sector, ;
decreases in this case, that is each sector becomes smaller. 5 Note that if condition g 0 o > + 1 does not hold then an increase in J always decreases a lobby's contribution.
To derive the e¤ects on tari¤s and subsidies, I di¤erentiate (12) to show that
Hence, we have that tari¤s in organized sectors fall while the subsidies in the unorganized sectors rise. Note that in the 'protection for sale'model for a …xed 0 an increase in the number of lobbies does not have any impact on tari¤s/subsidies. The reason is that there is no interaction among lobbies, and lobbying by a few large interest groups would result in the same tari¤s/subsidies as lobbying by many small ones. Hence, only the total proportion of capital owners in organized sectors matters for the government's decision making, and a change in the number of lobbies does not a¤ect trade policy, as long as 0 stays …xed.
Next, I di¤erentiate (13) ; keeping 0 constant
Hence, the result is similar to that above -each sector's contribution is increasing in the number of lobbies if and only if J is su¢ ciently small, i.e., J < 1 + p 1 + : decreases c in the former case but increases c in the latter case. Finally, when J is very large, i.e., J > 1 + p 1 + , then an increase in J reduces contribution from each organized sector in either case.
Conclusion
In this paper I introduce lobby interaction in the 'protection for sale' framework. I consider an alternative government objective function to allow for the marginal contribution of a lobby to be decreasing in total sum collected by the government. In contrast to the 'protection for sale' model, for a given proportion of capital owners in the organized sectors, an increase in the number of lobbies has an impact on trade policy. It is also shown that an increase in the number of lobbies has two opposite e¤ects on each lobby's contribution: a competition e¤ect which decreases a lobby's contribution and a political in ‡uence e¤ect which tends to increase its contribution.
